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Pleasant v. Johnson: The North Carolina Supreme Court Enters
the Twilight Zone-Is a Co-employee Liable in Tort for Willful,
Reckless, and Wanton Conduct?
The concept of willful, reckless and wanton negligence inhabits a twilight zone which exists somewhere between ordinary negligence and intentional injury.1
In Pleasant v. Johnson2 the North Carolina Supreme Court examined this

twilight zone for the first time when it determined whether willful, wanton, and
reckless conduct 3 should receive the same treatment as intentional misconduct 4

in a workers' compensation context. The issue in Pleasant was whether the
North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy for a
worker injured by the willful,5 wanton, 6 and reckless 7 conduct s of a coemployee. 9 The court held that the injured worker could recover both under the
1. Pleasant v. Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 714, 325 S.E.2d 244, 247 (1985).
2. 312 N.C. 710, 325 S.E.2d 244 (1985).
3. The Pleasantcourt failed to distinguish willful, wanton, and reckless conduct from willful,
wanton, and reckless negligence. The court apparently viewed conduct and negligence in this case to
be synonymous. Negligence has been defined as "conduct 'which falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm.'" PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 31, at 169 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER &
KEETON] (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 282 (1925)). The traditional elements of a cause of
action for negligence are: (1) a legal duty to conform to a certain standard of behavior to protect
others from unreasonable risks; (2) a failure to conform to the required standard; (3) the existence of
proximate cause demonstrated by a reasonably close causal relationship between the conduct and the
injury, and; (4) actual loss or damage. Id. § 30, at 164-65. For a discussion of willful, wanton, and
reckless conduct, see infra notes 5-8.
4. An intentional tort involves "an intent to bring about a result which will invade the interests of another in a way that the law forbids." Id. § 8, at 36. Intent extends not only to those
consequences desired by the party but also to those he or she believes are substantially certain to
follow. Because the invasion of the plaintiff's rights is regarded as a tort in itself, proof of actual
damage is not required. Id. Intentional torts include assault, battery, false imprisonment, infliction
of mental distress, trespass to land, trespass to chattels, and conversion. Id. §§ 9-15.
5. The Pleasant court defined "willful" as "the intentional failure to carry out some duty
imposed by law or contract which is necessary to the safety of the person or property to which it is
owed." 312 N.C. at 714, 325 S.E.2d at 248. When "willful" is used to refer to a breach of duty, only
the negligence is intentional. Id. at 714-15, 325 S.E.2d at 248. When "willful" is used in reference
to an injury, however, it is the injury that is intended. Id. Even though there may not be an actual
intent to injure, constructive intent may suffice when the conduct is "so reckless or manifestly indifferent to the consequences that a finding of willfulness and wantonness equivalent in spirit to actual
intent is justified." Id. at 715, 325 S.E.2d at 248.
6. The court defined "wanton" behavior as "an act manifesting a reckless disregard for the
rights and safety of others." Id. at 714, 325 S.E.2d at 248.
7. The Pleasantcourt stated that "reckless" is "merely a synonym for 'wanton' [that] has been
used in conjunction with it for many years." Id.
8. Willful, wanton, and reckless behavior has been defined as conduct that is "so far from a
proper state of mind that it is treated in many respects as if it were so intended." PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 3, § 34, at 213. Gross negligence has been defined as "a failure to exercise even
that care which a careless person would use." Id. at 212. The difference between the two is that
gross negligence concentrates on the particular act of the tortfeasor whereas willful, wanton, and
reckless conduct concentrates on the tortfeasor's state of mind at the time the act was committed.
Id. at 213-14. The court in Pleasantfailed to make any distinction between gross negligence and
willful, wanton, and reckless behavior.
9. The claimant must first show that he or she is an "employee" within the meaning of the
Workers' Compensation Act. Some employment relationship must exist, although it need not be
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Workers' Compensation Act and in a common-law tort action against the coemployee. 10 This Note analyzes the court's reasoning in Pleasant and discusses
new issues raised by the decision. It criticizes the court for frustrating the basic
policy behind the Workers' Compensation Act and suggests that the court could
have found the co-employee defendant liable without eroding traditional workers' compensation doctrine.
On May 13, 1980, Bill Pleasant was injured while returning from lunch to

the construction site where he and Victor Johnson were working on a project for
Electricon Incorporated." Johnson saw Pleasant walking across the parking
lot 1 2 and decided to scare him by driving a van 13 close to him and blowing the
horn. 14 Johnson misjudged the distance, however, and struck Pleasant, injuring
15
Pleasant's right knee.

Pleasant received disability payments under the Workers' Compensation

Act. 16

He also ified a civil action for damages against Johnson. 17 In addition to

alleging simple negligence, plaintiff asserted that "[d]efendant was willfully,
recklessly and wantonly negligent in that he was operating the motor vehicle in
formal and can even be oral or implied. See 8 N.C. INDEX 3D Master and Servant §§ 49-54 (1977)
(discussing the various categories of employees and whether they are covered by the North Carolina
Workers' Compensation Act).
10. Pleasant,312 N.C. at 711, 325 S.E.2d at 246. The court held that the employee was not
required to elect which remedy to pursue. Id. at 717, 325 S.E.2d at 249.
11. Id. at 711, 325 S.E.2d at 246.
12. Pleasant was clearly within the scope of his employment for workers' compensation purposes. "Neither side denies that Pleasant's injury arose out of and in the course of his employment."
Pleasant v. Johnson, 69 N.C. App. 538, 540, 317 S.E.2d. 104, 106 (1984), rev'd on othergrounds, 312
N.C. 710, 325 S.E.2d 244 (1985); see also Harless v. Flynn, 1 N.C. App. 448, 162 S.E.2d 47 (1968)
(employee injured by co-employee while leaving her employer's parking lot for lunch covered by the
North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act).
13. Electricon Inc. owned the van. See Plaintiff-Appellant's New Brief at 6; Defendant-Appellee's Brief at 4.
14. Pleasant, 312 N.C. at 711, 325 S.E.2d at 246.
15. Id. Pleasant was walking with another worker, Jessie Turner, at the time. At trial, Turner
testified that "he saw the van coming towards the two of them, he jumped out of the way, he yelled
'Look out, Bill,' he saw Bill Pleasant spin around towards the van and he saw the van hit Mr.
Pleasant." Plaintiff-Appellant's New Brief at 6. Pleasant also testified:
Jessie and I started back towards the building. Jessie was walking to me and I had my
head turned talking to him. Jessie hollered and said "Look out," and [then] I turned to
look, and when I did, the truck caught me on my right side, that is when it knocked me
down.
Id.
Johnson was fired as a result of the incident. The discharge slip read: "Victor Johnson was
fired today for horseplay with the company vehicle. He ran into William Pleasant with the truck,
knocking him to the ground, and tearing a ligament in his right knee." Id.
16. Pleasant, Electricon, and its carrier, U.S. Fire Insurance Co., signed an "Agreement for
Compensation for Disability." Record on Appeal at 19 (Defendant's Exhibit No. 1). Pleasant's
average weekly wage at the time of the injury was $211.35. The employer and carrier agreed to pay
him $140.90 a week until he could return to work at his usual salary. Id. This payment was in
compliance with the temporary total disability provision of the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act, which requires that "where the incapacity for work resulting from the injury is total, the
employer shall pay. . . to the injured employee during such total disability a weekly compensation
equal to sixty-six and two-thirds percent (66 2/3%) of his average weekly wages." N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 97-29 (1985).
17. The complaint, demanding a jury trial and compensatory and punitive damages in the
amount of $500,000, was filed on January 9, 1981. Record on Appeal at 1-2.
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such a fashion so as to see how close he could operate the said motor vehicle to
the plaintiff without actually striking him. ... "18

At the close of plaintiff's evidence the trial court granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict.1 9 The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed,

holding that the Workers' Compensation Act serves as the exclusive remedy for
work-related injuries and bars any later action against a co-employee. 20 On ap-

peal, the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, 21 holding
that willful, wanton, and reckless conduct removes a co-employee from the

workers' compensation immunity and
allows the injured fellow worker a recov22
ery both under the Act and in tort.

Co-employee liability in North Carolina is governed by sections 97-9 and
97-10.1 of the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act. 23 Section 97-9
18. Pleasant, 312 N.C. at 711, 325 S.E.2d at 246.
19. Id. When the defendant moves for a directed verdict at the conclusion of the plaintiff's
evidence, the judge, in deciding whether to grant the motion, must examine the evidence in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, giving it every reasonable inference that can be drawn. Investment
Properties of Asheville v. Allen, 281 N.C. 174, 188 S.E.2d 441 (1972).
20. Pleasant v. Johnson, 69 N.C. App. 538, 539, 317 S.E.2d 104, 105 (1984), rev'd, 312 N.C.
710, 325 S.E.2d 244 (1985). The court interpreted plaintiff's complaint as alleging only negligence:
"Pleasant brought his action in negligence; the trial court's instructions to the jury at recess indicated its understanding that this was a 'negligence action;' and Pleasant requested a directed verdict
in his favor solely on negligence grounds." Id. at 540, 317 S.E.2d at 106. The court refused to
accept plaintiff's contention that the evidence at trial established an intentional tort by defendant. If
the court had found that plaintiff's actions amounted to an intentional tort, the result of the case
would have been controlled by Andrews v. Peters, 55 N.C. App. 124, 284 S.E.2d 748 (1981), disc.
rev. denied, 305 N.C. 395, 290 S.E.2d 364 (1982). In Andrews defendant crept up behind plaintiff
and placed his knee behind hers, causing her to fall and injure herself. The court held that intentional injuries committed by a co-employee allowed an injured coworker to recover both in tort and
under the Workers' Compensation Act. Id. at 131, 284 S.E.2d at 752. For a more detailed discussion of Andrews, see infra text accompanying note 54 and note 55 and accompanying text.
The court of appeals noted that Andrews had been decided in December 1981 and that Pleasant
had not gone to trial until September 1982. Nevertheless, "Pleasant made no effort to amend his
complaint [to allege commission of an intentional tort]. Moreover, the pretrial order, approved and
filed September 27, 1982, discloses only issues of negligence. The same evidence supports the theory
of assault now raised on appeal and the theory of negligence tried below." Pleasant,69 N.C. App at
541, 317 S.E.2d at 106. The court therefore refused to hear the additional intentional tort theory
raised by plaintiff on appeal because defendant had not been given notice and an opportunity to
rebut such a theory at trial. Id.
Chief Judge Vaughn dissented. In his dissenting opinion, he stated that the complaint and the
evidence at trial were sufficient to show an intentional wrongful act by the defendant. "The results
of his intentional wrongful act were just as foreseeable as if he had aimed a pistol at [plaintiff] instead
of a truck." Id. at 543, 317 S.E.2d at 107.
21. Pleasant,312 N.C. 710, 717, 325 S.E.2d 244, 250.
22. The case was remanded to the Durham County Superior Court for trial in light of the
supreme court's holding. Id. at 718, 325 S.E.2d at 250. The court also overruled Wesley v. Lea, 252
N.C. 540, 114 S.E.2d 350 (1960), and Warner v. Leder, 234 N.C. 727, 69 S.E.2d 6 (1952), to the
extent that they conflicted with the opinion. Id. The court in Wesley and in Warner had required
intentional infliction of injury by a co-employee to remove the case from the Workers' Compensation Act. Reckless and wanton behavior was not sufficient to establish the requisite intent. Wesley,
252 N.C. at 545, 114 S.E.2d at 354; Warner, 234 N.C. at 733, 69 S.E.2d at 10.
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to -122 (1985). North Carolina first adopted a workers' compensation act in 1929. North Carolina Workmens' Compensation Act, ch. 120, 1929 N.C. Sess. Laws
117. For a general discussion of the history, development, and constitutionality of workers' compensation laws, see I A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 4.10-5.30 (1983); S.
HORovrrZ, INJURY AND DEATH UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS (1944).
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states: "Every employer ...

shall secure the payment of compensation to his

employees in the manner hereinafter provided; and ...

he or those conducting

his business shall only be liable to an employee for personal injury or death by
accident to the extent and in the manner herein specified." 24 Section 97-10.1
states:
If the employee and employer are subject to and have complied with
the provisions of this Article, then the rights and remedies herein
granted to the employee. . . shall exclude all otherrights and remedies
at common law or otherof the employee,. . . as against the employer
25
wise on account of such injury or death.

The North Carolina Supreme Court has declared that these two provisions

must be read together. 26 Therefore, the immunity from common-law actions the
employer has under section 97-10.1 also extends to "those [employees] con-

ducting his business" 27 under section 97-9. An individual who does not possess
is classified as a "third
the immunity conferred by sections 97-9 and 97-10.1
29
party" 28 and is amenable to suit at common law.
In North Carolina an employee cannot bring a common-law action against

a co-employee for negligence; the injured employee may recover only under the
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-9 (1985) (emphasis added).
25. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.1 (1985) (emphasis added).
26. Essick v. City of Lexington, 232 N.C. 200, 210, 60 S.E.2d 106, 113 (1950) ("We have no
space to call attention to the contradictions and fantastic situations that must arise under the application of G.S. § 97-10[.1] unless § 97-9 is given its weight in pari materia interpretation of both
sections, and the immunity given in Section 97-9 . . . be. .. carried through the provisions of
Section 97-10[.1]."); see also Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 409 F. Supp. 1211, 1215 (M.D.N.C.
1976) ("The courts of North Carolina have read § 97-9 in conjunction with § 97-10.1 to find that the
immunity from common law actions granted the employer in § 97-10.1 extends to those conducting
his business.").
27. The term "those conducting his business" in § 97-9 is to be given "a liberal construction."
Essick v. City of Lexington, 232 N.C. 200, 210, 60 S.E.2d 106, 113 (1950). Under workers' compensation, "[ilt is not necessary, in order to bring an employee within the protection of this statute, to
show that his act was such as would have been imputed to the employer at common law." Altman v.
Sanders, 267 N.C. 158, 161, 148 S.E.2d 21, 24 (1966).
28. The pertinent parts of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.2 (1985) provide as follows:
(a) The right to compensation and other benefits under this Article for disability, disfigurement, or death shall not be affected by the fact that the injury or death was caused under
circumstances creating a liability in some person other than the employer to pay damages
therefor, such person hereinafter being referred to as the "third party"....
(b) The employee, or his personal representative if he be dead, shall have the exclusive
right to proceed to enforce the liability of the third party ....
(c) If settlement is not made and summons is not issued within said 12-month period, and
if employer shall have filed with the Industrial Commission a written admission of liability
for the benefits provided by this Chapter, then either the employee or the employer shall
have the right to proceed to enforce the liability of the third party by appropriate proceedings ....
29. See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 23, § 72.00, at 14-54. Regarding the issue whether a coemployee is a "third party" and therefore liable to common-law suit, the various jurisdictions
throughout the United States may be separated into four categories: (1) those jurisdictions where the
co-employee is completely immune from any common-law action; (2) jurisdictions that allow a tort
action against a co-employee based on negligence alone; (3) jurisdictions that allow a tort action
against a co-employee only when he or she has engaged in an intentional tort or other specifically
prohibited activities; and (4) jurisdictions that allow for co-employee liability based on gross negligence or willful, wanton, and reckless conduct. Id §§ 72.11, 72.21.
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Workers' Compensation Act. 30 Prior to Pleasant, courts treated willful, wan-

ton, and reckless conduct or gross negligence by a co-employee as ordinary negligence. Such conduct therefore was insufficient to remove a co-employee's

immunity. 31 Thus, workers injured by a co-employee's willful, wanton, and
reckless conduct could recover benefits only under the Workers' Compensation

Act.32 An intentional tort by a co-employee, however, has always been held to

strip the co-employee of immunity under the Workers' Compensation Act and
33
to make him or her liable to the injured worker for common-law damages.
30. Pleasant, 312 N.C. at 713, 325 S.E.2d at 247 ("We. . . have interpreted the Act as foreclosing a worker who is injured in the course of his employment from suing a co-employee whose
negligence caused the injury."); see Strickland v. King, 293 N.C. 731, 733, 239 S.E.2d 243, 244
(1977) (allowing for common-law suit against a co-employee for injuries sustained in an automobile
collision on grounds that the injuries did not arise out of and in the course of their employment);
Altman v. Sanders, 267 N.C. 158, 161, 148 S.E.2d 21, 24 (1966) (employee struck by automobile
driven by co-employee in their employer's parking lot could not maintain common-law negligence
action for injuries sustained); Burgess v. Gibbs, 262 N.C. 462, 467, 137 S.E.2d 806, 809 (1964)
(plaintiff could not hold co-employee liable in action for negligence when injuries sustained in truck
accident occurred on drive home from work); Wesley v. Lea, 252 N.C. 540, 543, 114 S.E.2d 350, 353
(1960) (recovery by a National Guard private injured while riding as a passenger in a National
Guard specialist's automobile limited solely to a claim under the Workers' Compensation Act when
driver negligently struck telephone pole and overturned car), overruled in part, Pleasant, 312 N.C.
710, 325 S.E.2d 244 (1985); Warner v. Leder, 234 N.C. 727, 732, 69 S.E.2d 6, 9 (1952) (common-law
recovery denied for injuries sustained in an automobile accident negligently caused by co-employee
driver when injuries arose out of and in the course of their employment), overruled in part,Pleasant,
312 N.C. 710, 325 S.E.2d 244 (1985). See generally Stanley v. Brown, 261 N.C. 243, 245, 134 S.E.2d
321, 323 (1964) ("The Act does not purport to deal with an employee's common law right of action
against his fellow employee for damage to property." Therefore, a police officer could not hold a
fellow officer liable in tort for his personal injuries but could bring a cause of action for damages to

his car.).

31. Wesley v. Lea, 252 N.C. 540, 545, 114 S.E.2d 350, 354 (1960), overruled in part, Pleasant,
312 N.C. 710, 325 S.E.2d 244 (1985); Warner v. Leder, 234 N.C. 727, 733, 69 S.E.2d 6, 10 (1952),
overruled in part, Pleasant, 312 N.C. 710, 325 S.E.2d 244 (1985). Wesley involved an action by a
National Guard private against a fellow National Guard specialist for injuries sustained in an automobile accident in which the specialist negligently left the road, hit a telephone pole, and overturned
the car. The court stated:
Plaintiff contends that the conduct of defendant in the operation of the car was not merely
negligent, but was reckless and wanton. But to take the case out of the Workmen's Compensation Act the injuring of the employee by a co-employee must be intentional....
There is no evidence of any intention on the part of defendant to injure plaintiff.
Wesley, 252 N.C. at 545, 114 S.E.2d at 354 (emphasis added).
In Warnerthe employee brought an action against a co-employee who was driving a car at an
excessive rate of speed and collided with another car causing serious and permanent injuries to the
plaintiff. The court rejected plaintiff's argument that because defendant was guilty of "willful and
wanton conduct" he could be sued at common law. Warner, 234 N.C. at 733, 69 S.E.2d at 10, The
court based its holding on two considerations. First, defendant had claimed at trial that he did not
intentionally injure plaintiff. Id. Second, plaintiff had applied for and received benefits under the
Workers' Compensation Act, thereby foreclosing any right he may have had under common law.
Id.
32. Wesley v. Lea, 252 N.C. 540, 114 S.E.2d 350 (1960), overruled in part,Pleasant, 312 N.C.
710, 325 S.E.2d 244 (1985); Warner v. Leder, 234 N.C. 727, 69 S.E.2d 6 (1952), overruled in part,
Pleasant, 312 N.C. 710, 325 S.E.2d 244 (1985).
33. Pleasant,312 N.C. at 713, 325 S.E.2d at 247; Daniels v. Swofford, 55 N.C. App. 555, 286
S.E.2d 582 (1982) (exclusivity provision of Workers' Compensation Act did not bar employee from
bringing action against co-employee who subjected her to verbal abuse and kicked her in the leg);
Andrews v. Peters, 55 N.C. App. 124, 284 S.E.2d 748 (1981) (North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act is not the exclusive remedy for an employee injured by a co-employee who walked up
behind her and placed his right knee behind her right knee causing her to fall and injure herself),
disc rev. denied, 305 N.C. 395, 290 S.E.2d 364 (1982).
Prior to Pleasantthe North Carolina Supreme Court had never directly faced the issue whether
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The majority34 in Pleasantoffered three broadly stated rationales in support

of its holding that willful, wanton, and reckless conduct removes a coemployee's immunity from common-law tort actions. First, the court stated

that in the past it has implicitly treated wanton and reckless behavior as intentional for purposes of awarding punitive damages and similarly has held that

evidence of wanton and reckless conduct is sufficient to impute malice to a defendant charged with second degree homicide. 35 The court concluded "that in-

jury to another resulting from willful, wanton and reckless negligence should
also be treated as an intentional injury for purposes of our Workers' Compensa'36
tion Act."
The court acknowledged that the quid pro quo between the employer, who
cannot raise common-law defenses 37 under the Workers' Compensation Act and
an employee could pursue a common-law remedy when intentional misconduct by a co-employee
was involved. In Wesley v. Lea, 252 N.C. 540, 114 S.E.2d 350 (1960), overruled in part, Pleasant,
312 N.C. 710, 325 S.E.2d 244 (1985), however, the court stated in dicta that "to take the case out of
the Workmen's Compensation Act the injury to the employee by a co-employee must be intentional." Id. at 545, 114 S.E.2d at 354.
34. Justice Meyer dissented. Pleasant, 312 N.C. at 718, 325 S.E.2d at 250. His dissent is discussed infra at notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
35. Pleasant, 312 N.C. at 715, 325 S.E.2d at 248. In support of its analogy to punitive damages, the court cited two cases, Hinson v. Dawson, 244 N.C. 23, 92 S.E.2d 393 (1956), and Binder v.
General Motors Acceptance Corp., 222 N.C. 512, 23 S.E.2d 894 (1943). Hinson involved a personal
injury and property damage action that arose out of an automobile collision. The plaintiff alleged
that defendants were guilty of reckless and wanton disregard for the life and safety of plaintiff's
intestate because defendant minor, who suffered from defective vision, was driving the car with
defendant owner's permission. Hinson, 244 N.C. at 28-29, 92 S.E.2d at 397. The court held that
these allegations were sufficient to show wanton negligence, thereby justifying an award of punitive
damages. Id. at 29, 92 S.E.2d at 397. The Hinson court stated that courts have used gross negligence in the same sense as wanton negligence, id. at 28, 92 S.E.2d at 396, and that "[conduct is
wanton when [it is]
in conscious and intentional disregard of and indifference to the rights and safety
of others." Id. at 28, 92 S.E.2d at 397.
In Binder agents of defendant seized the plaintiff's car under the mistaken belief that payments
were in arrears. The methods used by the agents were sufficient to put plaintiff on notice that any
resistance on his part would inevitably lead to a breach of the peace. Binder, 222 N.C. at 516, 23
S.E.2d at 896. The court held that the manner in which the car was taken showed a willful disregard
for the rights of another sufficient to justify punitive damages. Id.
To illustrate the analogy to malice cases, the court cited State v. Snyder, 311 N.C. 391, 317
S.E.2d 394 (1984), and State v. Trott, 190 N.C. 674, 130 S.E. 627 (1925). In Snyder the supreme
court reversed the court of appeals' holding that there was no evidence of malice on the part of the
defendant on grounds that the testimony at trial showed that defendant had been drinking throughout the afternoon, had been fighting with others at a bar, and had gone through a red light at sixty to
seventy miles per hour. Snyder, 311 N.C. at 392, 317 S.E.2d at 394-95. The Snyder court held that
when a defendant acts in a manner exhibiting "'a mind regardless of social duty and deliberately
bent on mischief, though there be no intention to injure a particular person,'" there is sufficient
evidence to supply the malice necessary for second degree murder. Id. at 394, 317 S.E.2d at 396
(quoting State v. Wilkerson, 295 N.C. 559, 581, 247 S.E.2d 905, 917 (1978)). In Trott the court held
that a defendant under the influence of alcohol, who instructed another intoxicated individual to
drive, could be found to have acted so recklessly or wantonly as to show depravity of mind and
disregard for human life. Trott, 190 N.C. at 680, 130 S.E. at 630. In PleasantJustice Meyer expressed disapproval of the majority's reliance on Trott. Pleasant, 312 N.C. at 723-24, 325 S.E.2d at
252-53 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
36. Pleasant, 312 N.C. at 715, 325 S.E.2d at 248.
37. These defenses, which include contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellowservant rule, traditionally have been known as the "unholy trinity" because of the harsh manner in
which they serve to excuse the employer and leave an injured employee without any remedy. Pleasant, 312 N.C. at 711, 325 S.E.2d at 246; S.HoRovrrz, supra note 23, at 2-3; 1 A. LARSON, supra
note 23, § 4.30, at 25 to 27.
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who thus becomes automatically liable, and the employee, who abandons the
right to damages at common law, 38 is applicable to co-employees. 39
"[Immunity from common law suit for ordinary negligence is part of that
which an employee receives for forfeiting his own right to bring a negligence
action." 40 The court found that the quid pro quo theory, however, does not
apply to intentional torts.41 "One can understand the extension of an employer's immunity to employees when one considers the industrial setting. Accidents are bound to happen. By accepting employment, a worker increases not
only the risk of injuring himself but also the risk of negligently injuring
others." 42 Injuries due to intentional wrongful conduct, however, are not expected to occur in the workplace. The Pleasant court viewed injuries resulting
from willful, wanton, and reckless conduct in the same light-such injuries are
not of the sort expected to occur in the workplace. Therefore, such behavior
43
falls outside the scope of the immunity.
The Pleasantcourt's second rationale for permitting an injured employee to
sue a fellow employee for willful, wanton, and reckless conduct was that "allowing an injured co-worker to sue the tortfeasor serves as a deterrent against
future misconduct." 44 The court reasoned that "since negligence connotes unconscious inadvertence, allowing injured workers to sue co-employees would not
reduce injuries caused by ordinary negligence. The same cannot be said in cases
involving intentional torts."'4 5 Therefore, the court concluded that "this result
'46
will help to deter such conduct in the future."
The Pleasantcourt reasoned that allowing a common-law action against the
co-employee would place responsibility upon the actual tortfeasor, where it
rightfully belongs. 47 This reasoning appears inconsistent with the theory of enterprise liability on which the workers' compensation system is based. 48 As one
commentator noted:
The right to compensation benefits depends on one simple test: Was

86.

38. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 23, § 65.11, at 12-1.
39. Id. § 72.22, at 14-86.
40. Pleasant,312 N.C. at 716, 325 S.E.2d at 249; 2A A. LARSON, supranote 23, § 72.22, at 14-

41. Pleasant,312 N.C. at 716, 325 S.E.2d at 249. The West Virginia Supreme Court has rcjected the quid pro quo theory. See Tawney v. Kirkhart, 130 W. Va. 550, 44 S.E.2d 634 (1947).
Tawney involved an action for the death of a truck passenger at a railroad crossing as the result of a
co-employee truck driver's negligence. The court reasoned that because employees did not contribute to the workers' compensation fund, giving them any immunity would amount to "gratuitous
protection for [their] own misconduct." Id. at 563, 44 S.E.2d at 641; see also Note, Massey v.
Selensky: Workers' Compensation and Co-Employee Immunity in Montana,46 MONT. L. REV. 217,
224-25 (1985) (citing Tawney and arguing that the quid pro quo rationale cannot apply to coemployees).
42. Andrews v. Peters, 55 N.C. App. 124, 126-27, 284 S.E.2d 748, 750 (1981) (cited with approval in Pleasant,312 N.C. at 716, 325 S.E.2d at 249). For a discussion of Andrews, see infra text
accompanying note 54 and note 55 and accompanying text.
43. Pleasant, 312 N.C. at 717, 325 S.E.2d at 249.
44. Id.

45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 716, 325 S.E.2d at 249.
Id. at 717-18, 325 S.E.2d at 250.
Id. at 717, 325 S.E.2d at 249.
See infra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
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there a work connected injury? Negligence, and for the most part,
fault, are not in issue and cannot affect the result .... Thus, the test
is not the relation of an individual's personal quality (fault) to an
event, but the relationship of an event to an employment. The essence
of applying the test is not a matter of assessing blame, but of marking
out boundaries. 49
The court, however, relying on the reasoning of the North Carolina Court of
Appeals in Daniels v. Swofford 50 and Andrews v. Peters,5 1 rejected the argument
that permitting an employee to sue a co-employee would frustrate the goals of
the workers' compensation system.
Plaintiff in Daniels alleged that defendant, the president of a codefendant
corporation, had "intentionally, unlawfully, wantonly and maliciously" 52 assaulted her by kicking her in the right knee. The North Carolina Court of Appeals held that "[s]uch misconduct is outside the realm of industrial accidents
which workers' compensation laws were designed to exclusively cover. We will
not allow the assaultive employee to use a remedial statute as a shield against
'5 3
financial responsibility for his misconduct."
In Andrews defendant crept up behind plaintiff and placed his knee behind
hers, causing her to fall and injure herself.5 4 After receiving compensation
under the Act, plaintiff filed suit against the co-employee defendant. The court
concluded that in passing the Act the general assembly did not intend for intentional torts to give rise to co-employee immunity.5 5 The Pleasant court held
that the arguments in Daniels andAndrews were just as applicable in the context
of willful, wanton, and reckless conduct as they were in the context of inten56
tional wrongful conduct.
The court's final reason for giving employees injured through willful, wanton, and reckless conduct a cause of action in tort was that "[i]t would be a
travesty of justice and logic to permit a worker to injure a co-employee through
such conduct, and then compel the injured co-employee to accept moderate benefits under the Act."'5 7 This argument is similar to the theory that co-employee
49. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 23, § 2.10.
50. 55 N.C.App. 555, 286 S.E.2d 582 (1982).
51. 55 N.C. App. 124, 284 S.E.2d 748 (1981), disc rev. denied, 305 N.C. 395, 290 S.E.2d 364
(1982).
52. Daniels, 55 N.C. App. at 556, 286 S.E.2d at 583.
53. Id. at 562, 286 S.E.2d at 586.
54. Andrews, 55 N.C. App. at 124, 284 S.E.2d at 748.
55. Id. at 127, 284 S.E.2d at 750. The court stated that to hold otherwise would relieve coemployees of any responsibility for their actions: "Why should [a co-employee] be concerned about
the consequences if the cost of any intentionally-inflicted injury will be absorbed by the industry?"

Id.
56. Pleasant, 312 N.C. at 713-14, 325 S.E.2d at 247.
57. Id. at 718, 325 S.E.2d at 250. The Pleasantcourt cited S. HOROVrrz, supra note 23, which
states:
Where the employer is guilty of felonious or willful assault on an employee he cannot
relegate him to the compensation act for recovery. It would be against sound reason to
allow the employer to batter his helper, and then compel the worker to accept moderate
workmen's compensation benefits, either from his insurance carrier or from himself as selfinsurer. The weight of authority gives the employee the choice of suing the employer at
common law or accepting compensation.
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immunity is unconscionable"8 because workers' compensation recoveries tradi-

tionally provide only minimal compensation for injuries. Holding a co-employee liable may violate the principle of enterprise liability, which shifts the
burden of compensating injured employees to the employer so that it may be
passed on to consumers.5 9 At least one commentator has argued, however, that
the burden is no better distributed when it is disproportionately placed on the
injured employee. 60 In response, another commentator has asserted:
Even among those who contend that the scale of benefits is generally
too low, there are few if any who would contend that anything resem-

bling tort principles of amount of recovery should be imported into
compensation law. It was never intended that compensation payments
should equal actual loss, for the reason, if no other, that such a scale
would encourage malingering. 6 1

Id. at 336. Apparently the court intended to draw an analogy between intentional torts committed
by an employer and willful, wanton, and reckless conduct by a co-employee.
58. See Note, supra note 41, at 225 (co-employee immunity unconscionable because payments
made to an employee under the Workers' Compensation Act are inadequate).
The Alabama Supreme Court has declared co-employee immunity under workers' compensation to be unconstitutional as a violation of its open courts provision, Grantham v. Denke, 359 So.
2d 785 (Ala. 1978), which provides that "all courts shall be open; and that every person, for any
injury done him, in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have a remedy by due process of
law; and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, or delay." ALA. CONST. art. I,
§ 13. For a discussion of co-employee liability under the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act, see
Johnson & Cassady, Co-Employee Lawsuits Under the Alabama Workmen's Compensation Acts, 14
CuM. L. REv. 267 (1984). North Carolina has a similar constitutional provision: "All courts shall
be open; every person for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation shall have
remedy by due course of law; and right and justice shall be administered without favor, denial, or
delay." N.C. CONST. art. I, § 18.
59. See infra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
60. Note, supra note 41, at 225.
61. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 23, § 2.50, at 12.
Two other reasons have been given for providing an employee a common-law remedy against a
co-employee. First, the prevailing view is that unless there is clear language in the statute, the
legislature will not be presumed to have acted in derogation of the common law. Unless the legislature has specifically eliminated a common-law remedy by statute, the remedy is deemed to still exist.
See Roda v. Williams, 195 Kan. 507, 510, 407 P.2d 471, 475 (1965) (holding that parents of employee killed by negligence of co-employee could bring wrongful death action under Kansas Workers' Compensation Act that allowed a common-law tort action against "some person other than the
employer"); Hockett v. Chapman, 69 N.M. 324, 325, 366 P.2d 850, 851 (1961) (holding that coemployee was liable in tort for his negligence in automobile accident because New Mexico Workers'
Compensation Act broadly stated that an employee may proceed in tort against "any person other
than the employer"). In North Carolina this argument has not been successful. As noted by the
court in Essick v. City of Lexington, 232 N.C. 200, 208, 60 S.E.2d 106, 112 (1950):
The Workmen's Compensation Act is not a mere island in the sea of common law. The
statutes creating it, amended from time to time, are superior to the common law in those
respects in which they can and do, amend or abrogate it. There is no presumption of
superiority in the common law where they seem to clash.
A second rationale is that workers' compensation may pose a danger to workers engaged in
dangerous occupations because it provides little incentive for the promotion of industrial safety. A
worker who knows he or she will be immune from personal liability for on-the-job accidents may be
less safety conscious. See Judson v. Fielding, 227 A.D. 430, 237 N.Y.S. 348 (1929), aff'd, 253 N.Y.
596, 171 N.E. 798 (1930). In Judson the court held that a cause of action against a co-employee
existed for the death of a passenger in a car driven by a co-employee at an excessive speed over icy
roads. The court reasoned that to "hold that a fellow servant should under no circumstances be
liable to another for damages resulting from a negligent or willful act . . . would be fraught with
highly dangerous consequences and would remove in a large measure the restraint of personal responsibility of the employee for his acts." Id. at 438, 237 N.Y.S. at 354. But see Marks, Erosion of
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Courts and commentators have advanced several reasons in support of providing co-employee immunity under workers' compensation schemes. First, by
providing immunity, the Workers' Compensation Act reduces the tension coemployees may feel at the possibility of being sued because of mishaps in the

actions beworkplace. Co-employee immunity eliminates the possibility of civil
62
tween employees and thus increases harmony in the workplace.
Second, some courts apply the traditional master-servant vicarious liability
test, which provides immunity to an employee whenever he or she is acting
within the scope of employment. 6 3 Under this test, as long as the employee is

acting in the employer's interests, he or she "becomes" the employer for purposes of the suit and takes on the employer's immunity. 64

Third, co-employee immunity has been recognized as a necessary and consistent corollary to the basic workers' compensation principle of enterprise liability.65 The North Carolina Supreme Court itself has been a major advocate of
this position. In Warner v. Leder 66 plaintiff passenger was injured in a car

driven by defendant co-employee. After receiving benefits under the Workers'
the Exclusive Workers' CompensationRemedy: Suits Against Co-Employees and Compensation Carriers, 17 A.B.A. FORUM 395 (1981) (criticizing the recent trend towards allowing common-law suits
against co-employees and insurance carriers).
62. See Note, supra note 41, at 225-26; O'Brien v. Rautenbush, 10 Iln. 2d 167, 139 N.E.2d 222
(1956). In O'Brien plaintiff attempted to recover damages against a negligent co-employee for injuries suffered in an automobile accident. Holding such an action barred by the Workers' Compensation Act, the court stated:
In view of the fact that a considerable portion of industrial injuries can be traced to the
negligence of a coworker, [co-employee] litigation could reach staggering proportions, and
would not only tend to encourage corrupt and fraudulent practices but would also disrupt
the harmonious relations which exist between coworkers.
Id. at 174, 139 N.E.2d at 226.
The reasoning in O'Brien subsequently has been disapproved, however. See Rylander v. Chicago Short-line Ry. Co., 17 Il. 2d 618, 161 N.E.2d 812 (1959). The Rylander court held that the
Workers' Compensation Act precludes a common-law action for damages by an employee against a
negligent co-employee, but stated that this result primarily follows from the enterprise liability principle of placing the cost of industrial accidents on the industry. Id. at 628, 161 N.E.2d at 818.
63. See Marks, supra note 61, at 398.
64. Idaho uses this approach. See Nichols v. Godfrey, 90 Idaho 345, 411 P.2d 763 (1966)
(plaintiff could not maintain common-law tort action against co-employee who was driving state
truck under the consent and direction of the state and in the course of its business); White v. Ponozzo, 77 Idaho 276, 280, 291 P.2d 843, 845 (1955) (defendant co-employee was acting within scope
of his employment as agent of his employer when he injured plaintiff in automobile accident: "His
acts and conduct became the acts and conduct of the employer, and the exemption from damages at
law extended to the employer by the Workmen's Compensation Law is also by the act extended to
co-employees through whom the employer acts."); see also House v. Mine Safety Appliances Co.,
417 F. Supp. 939 (D. Idaho 1976) (union member cannot sue fellow union member for negligence in
enforcing safety standards against mine fires because fellow members are equivalent to co-employees
and acted as agents of their employer).
In North Carolina, however, this approach has been rejected. Altman v. Sanders, 267 N.C. 158,
148 S.E.2d 21 (1966). In Altman plaintiff had parked her car in a parking lot maintained by her
employer and was struck by a co-employee who was also arriving for work. The Altman court
refused to limit immunity to only those acts for which the employer would be liable under respondeat
superior. Under Altman, the co-employee is immune from suit so long as he or she is acting within
the course and scope of employment. Id. at 161, 148 S.E.2d at 24.
65. See infra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
66. 234 N.C. 727, 69 S.E.2d 6 (1952), overruled in part,Pleasant, 312 N.C. 710, 325 S.E.2d 244
(1985). For a general discussion of Warner, see Note, Workmen's Compensation-Rightof Employee to Bring Common Law Action Against Negligent Co-Employee, 30 N.C.L. REv. 474 (1952).
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Compensation Act, plaintiff sued defendant for negligence. The court held that
the Act foreclosed plaintiff's common-law action. 67 Allowing recovery in tort
would defeat the very purpose of the Act, which is to transfer "from the worker
to the industry, or business in which he is employed, and ultimately to the consuming public, a greater proportion of the economic loss due to accidents."'68
A related criticism of co-employee liability is that it shifts the risk of loss
resulting from an accident from the employer and the business to the employee.
Under section 97-10.2(f), any award received by an injured worker in a civil
action must be used to reimburse the employer or the carrier for expenses incurred and benefits paid out under the Act.69 Thus, the injured employee is
entitled only to the amount of a civil award remaining after the employer has
been repaid for workers' compensation benefits. 70 For example, in Byers v.
North Carolina State Highway Commission,7 1 the administratrix of a deceased
employee received $7,500 in full settlement of a claim against a company for the
negligence of its agent in driving a 40,000 pound load of concrete across a bridge
designed to carry only 20,000 pounds. 72 At the time of the settlement, the decedent's employer projected an outlay of over $12,000 in workers' compensation
payments on account of the employee's death.73 The North Carolina Supreme
Court held that the reimbursement provisions of section 97-10.2(f) were
mandatory and that plaintiff was required to deliver to the employer all of the
proceeds of the settlement of death action against the third party. 74 Similarly,
the court of appeals has required a third-party tortfeasor's liability carrier to
withhold from its wrongful death settlement with the employee's widow the
amount of money the employer's carrier had previously paid the widow pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act. 75 This reimbursement had to be withheld even though it required the insurance carrier to pay an amount over and
above the agreed upon settlement reached with the widow. 76 Thus, holding the
co-employee liable frees the employer and the compensation carrier from their
normal financial responsibilities and places the burden on the co-employee.
67. Warner, 234 N.C. at 732-33, 69 S.E.2d at 9-10.
68. Id. at 733, 69 S.E.2d at 10.
69. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.2(f)(1)(c) (1985). For a summary of this provision, see infra note

79. The insurance carrier is granted all rights of the employer in subsection (g). See generally2A A.
LARSON, supra note 23, §§ 74.00 -.42 (discussing the five types of subrogation statutes, acts affecting
assignment, distribution of proceeds, and proper parties to third party actions).

70. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.2(f)(1)(d) (1985). For a summary of this provision, see infra note
79.
71. 275 N.C. 229, 166 S.E.2d 649 (1969).
72. Id. at 231, 166 S.E.2d at 650.

73. Id.
74. Id. at 232-34, 166 S.E.2d at 651-52.
75. Williams v. Insurance Repair Specialists, 32 N.C. App. 235, 232 S.E.2d 5 (1977). In Wil-

liams the third-party tortfeasor's liability carrier entered into an agreement with the deceased employee's widow for the payment of $55,000 in full settlement of her wrongful death claim without the
knowledge or consent of the employer's workers' compensation carrier. Thereafter, the compensation carrier agreed to pay the widow a total of $28,500. The court of appeals held that the
tortfeasor's liability carrier had to pay the workers' compensation carrier the $28,500 despite the fact
that the widow had spent her entire share of the $55,000 wrongful death settlement. Id. at 240-41,
232 S.E.2d at 9.
76. Id.
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Section 97-10.2(c) further shifts the risk of loss by providing that the em-

ployer or the employer's carrier may sue a liable co-employee for reimbursement
if the injured worker fails to do so within one year.7 7 The Virginia Supreme
Court has commented on the problems likely to result from allowing employers
to sue co-employees directly:
Instead of the loss of. . . industrial accidents being cast upon business
as an expense thereof, the wages of fellow workmen will become an
ultimate insurance fund for the exoneration of both industry and compensation insurance carriers for the ultimate loss. Instead of providing
relief to workmen, it will place in the power of employers and compen[losses] from workmen
sation insurance carriers the right to recoup
78
which should be borne by the business.
The Warner court noted that under the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act's subrogation provisions, which provide for the manner of disburse-

ment,79 the burden would be shifted "to those conducting the business of the
employer to the extent of their solvency." 80 Justice Meyer in Pleasant echoed

this concern in his dissenting opinion: "[Allowing co-employee liability] will
not hurt the employer-he can only gain by recovery of amounts already paid
out in benefits. It will harm the employee by subjecting him to civil actions to

which he is not now exposed."'8 1 It is unlikely that a co-employee exposed to
personal liability will be able to satisfy a large tort judgment. Thus, allowing co-

employee liability generally will not promote the central purpose of tort law-to

82
restore the injured party to his or her position before the tort, and it also

the burden on
violates the basic premise of workers' compensation law-to place
83
the industry so that costs may be passed on to the consumer.

The North Carolina Supreme Court's second major holding in Pleasantwas
that the injured employee need not choose whether to recover under workers'
77. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.2(c) (1985); see supra note 28 (quoting statute).

78. Feitig v. Chalkley, 185 Va. 96, 104, 38 S.E.2d 73, 76-77 (1946); see infra text accompanying
note 81.
79. The pertinent provision of the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act providing for
the manner of disbursement and subrogation is N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.2 (1985). Subsection (f)
provides that if an injured employee is entitled to or receives benefits under the Act and is also
successful in obtaining a common-law judgment against the negligent "third party," the proceeds are
to be distributed in the following order of priority: First, to the payment of actual court costs;
second, to the employee's attorney for fees incurred in the successful tort action or settlement; third,
to the employer for medical treatment or compensation benefits paid or to be paid under the Act;
and last, to the injured employee who brought the suit or his or her personal representative. Subsection (g) grants the employer's workers' compensation carrier the right of subrogation to any rights
and liabilities the employer may have. Subsection (h) grants to each of the parties in subsection (f)
an automatic lien on any favorable judgment or settlement received in the common-law tort action.
Neither the employer nor the employee can accept any payment from the negligent third party or
release him or her from liability unless the other party gives written consent. See N.C. GEN STAT.
§ 97-10.2 (f), (g), (h) (1985).
80. Warner, 234 N.C. at 733, 69 S.E.2d at 10.
81. Pleasant,312 N.C. at 724, 325 S.E.2d at 253 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
82. "The civil action for a tort. . . is commenced and maintained by the injured person himself, and its purpose is to compensate him for the damage he has suffered, at the expense of the
wrongdoer." PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, § 2, at 7.
83. See infra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
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compensation or under common law but may recover under both.s4 The court
gave two reasons in support of this decision. First, because the negligent coemployee neither participates in the workers' compensation claim nor contributes to the amount awarded, he or she cannot suffer any undue prejudice by
being sued after an award has been made. 85 The court of appeals had previously
used this reasoning inAndrews v. Peters.86 In deciding to allow recovery against
a co-employee who had committed an intentional tort,87 the court of appeals
noted the difference between those cases in which the defendant is an employer
and those in which the defendant is a co-employee. If the defendant employer is
liable in tort, the employee should be required to make an election between common-law and workers' compensation recoveries.8 8 Under the Workers' Compensation Act, either the employer or the employer's insurance carrier must
defend the claim and satisfy any amount of compensation awarded. 8 9 "Therefore a tort action in addition to the statutory action means the employer must
defend against the same claim in two separate forums." 90 The court held that
the same reasoning does not apply to a co-employee who "has contributed
neither to the defense of any compensation claim nor to the satisfaction of any
award." 9 1
The second reason advanced by the Pleasantcourt for allowing both workers' compensation and common-law recoveries was based on the method of disbursement provided by the Act. 92 Any amount the injured worker receives from
the tort action will be disbursed according to the provisions of North Carolina
General Statutes section 97-10.2, which requires reimbursement to the employer
or the insurance company for amounts paid under the Workers' Compensation
Act. 93 Because the employer or the carrier is entitled to reimbursement from
any tort proceeds the injured employee may receive,94 "the burden otherwise
95
placed upon an innocent employer or insurer" may be reduced.
The advantages of allowing recovery under workers' compensation and in
tort are evidenced by the dilemma that may arise when a plaintiff is forced to
elect only one remedy. In South Carolina, where a plaintiff may be required to
elect a single remedy, 96 such a dilemma arose in Talley v. Johns-Manville Sales
84. Pleasant, 312 N.C. at 717, 325 S.E.2d at 249-50.
85. Id.
86. 55 N.C. App. 124, 130, 284 S.E.2d 748, 751 (1981), disc. rev. denied, 305 N.C. 395, 290
S.E.2d (1982).
87. Id.; see supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
88. Id. at 129, 284 S.E.2d at 751.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 130, 284 S.E.2d at 751.
92. See supra note 79.
93. Pleasant, 312 N.C. at 717, 325 S.E.2d at 249-50. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.2 and its effect
on disbursement are discussed supra at text accompanying notes 69-70 and supra at note 79.
94. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.2(f)(1)(c) (1985) (summarized supra note 79).
95. Pleasant, 312 N.C. at 717, 325 S.E.2d at 249-50.
96. See Fisher v. South Carolina Dept. of Mental Retardation, 277 S.C. 573, 291 S.E.2d 200
(1982) (plaintiff who entered into a settlement with a third-party tortfeasor without the consent of
the workers' compensation carrier had made an election of remedies and could not thereafter main-

tain a workers' compensation claim for additional benefits).
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Corp.97 Plaintiffs in Talley were diagnosed as having asbestosis, a slowly progressive occupational disease that frequently is diagnosed years before any disa-

bility actionable under workers' compensation occurs. The statute of limitations
in these cases, however, generally runs from the date of diagnosis. 98 The South

Carolina Supreme Court summed up plaintiffs' position: "If [plaintiffs] bring
and conclude their third-party actions, they will be barred from seeking Workers' Compensation. . . . If they wait until they become disabled for the purposes of worker's compensation, their third-party actions will be barred by the

statute of limitations." 99 Such an unjust result is a good reason to allow recovery under both workers' compensation and tort. 1° °

In North Carolina, however, the most compelling argument for allowing
election of remedies is the wording of the workers' compensation statute itself:
Institution of proceedings against or settlement with the third party, or
acceptance of benefits under this Chapter, shall not in any way or manner affect any other remedy which any party to the claim for compensation may have except as otherwise specifically provided in this
Chapter, and the exercise of one remedy shall not in any way or manner
1° 1
be held to constitute an election of remedies so as to bar the other.
Thus, if the injured employee complies with the other sections of the Act, he or

she may bring a common-law action against the third party in addition to seeking recovery under workers' compensation. 10 2

97. 285 S.C. 117, 328 S.E.2d 621 (1985).
98. Id. at 118, 328 S.E.2d at 622. For a discussion of how statutes of repose may unconstitutionally bar actions by plaintiffs with delayed manifestation diseases such as asbestosis even if the

action is brought within the applicable statute of limitations, see Note, Wilder v. Amatex Corp.: A
FirstStep TowardAmeliorating the Effect of Statutes ofRepose on Plaintiffswith Delayed Manifestation Diseases, 64 N.C.L. REv.416 (1986).
99. Talley, 285 S.C. at 119, 328 S.E.2d at 622.
100. The South Carolina Supreme Court's solution was a makeshift one. Plaintiffs were granted
a stay of their third-party actions until their workers' compensation actions were resolved or "[t]he
legislature solves this dilemma." Talley, 285 S.C. at 119, 328 S.E.2d at 623. As the dissenting justice
pointed out, it is likely that the matter will remain stayed for many years, forcing defendants to
retain attorneys and keeping the lawsuits on the dockets for years to come. Id. at 120-21, 328 S.E.2d
at 623. (Littlejohn, C.J., dissenting).
101. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.2(i) (1985) (emphasis added).
102. The requirement that the employee comply with the other sections of the Workers' Compensation Act protects against a double recovery. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.2 (1985) requires reimbursement to the employer for expenses incurred under the Act, grants each party a lien upon any
amount awarded, and provides that no settlement can be made against the third party without the
written consent of the employer. For a summary of these provisions, see supra note 79.
In Barrino v. Radiator Specialty Co., No. 439A84 (N.C. Feb. 18, 1986), the supreme court
acknowledged that an employee injured by a co-employee's willful, wanton, and reckless conduct
can recover under both the Workers' Compensation Act and in tort. Id. at 14-15. The court, however, refused to hold that an employee injured by an employer's willful, wanton, and reckless conduct
could bring an action in tort. The court held that only proof of intentionalconduct by the employer
was sufficient to remove the employer from the shield against tort liability provided by the Workers'
Compensation Act. Id. at 9-10. Even if plaintiff's allegations had established the intent necessary to
remove the immunity an employer normally enjoys under the Workers' Compensation Act, the fact
that plaintiff had already received compensation benefits under the Act established a binding election
of remedies. Id. at 18-19; see also id. at 1 (Billings, J., concurring) (stating that the court did not
need to decide whether defendant was guilty of an intentional assault because plaintiff had made a
binding election in receiving compensation under the Act). In his dissent, Justice Martin disagreed
with the court's election of remedies analysis. First, the election of remedies doctrine has only been
applied in North Carolina to cases involving negligence; it is not appropriate to apply it in a case in
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The decision in Pleasantraises several new issues. 103 The principles enun-

ciated in Pleasantsuggested the question whether an injured employee may sue
the employer in tort for willful, wanton, and reckless conduct. In assessing the
potential liability of an employer, the Pleasant court stated: "The issue in this
case is whether an injured worker may maintain a common law tort action
against a co-employee whose willful, wanton and reckless negligence caused the
worker's injury. We need not consider and do not decide whether an employer
may be sued for similar conduct." 1 4
The court's reluctance to decide the question of employer liability in Pleasant foreshadowed its ultimate resolution of this question less than a year later in
Barrino v. RadiatorSpecialty Co. 10 5 In Barrino the supreme court held that the
Workers' Compensation Act provided the exclusive remedy for an employee injured through an employer's willful, wanton, and reckless conduct.10 6 Plaintiff
in Barrino,the father and administrator of decedent employee's estate, filed suit
against decedent's employer after decedent was killed in a factory explosion. 107
The complaint alleged that the employer had operated equipment utilizing liquifled petroleum gases without adequate inspections and in violation of safety regulations, had committed six separate violations of the National Electrical Code
and the Occupational Safety and Health Act of North Carolina, had covered
meters designed to detect dangerous gases and vapors so as to render them inop-

erative, had used equipment without explosion-proof safeguards, and had turned
off the warning alarms and instructed the employees to continue working despite
which the plaintiff has alleged an intentional tort. Second, the defendant did not meet his burden of
demonstrating that there is an inherent inconsistency in receiving both workers' compensation payments and a recovery in tort. Third, it was equitable for the court to impose the requirement that an
injured employee forego all compensation while pursuing a common-law tort claim. Last, the reasoning that an employee suffering economic pressures "freely" decides to accept compensation under
the Act rather than pursue a recovery in tort is sophistic. Id at 8-10 (Martin, J., dissenting).
103. A tangential issue that arises in the wake of Pleasantconcerns the problems that an employee is likely to face in being insured for liability to a co-employee. There are usually three insurance policy carriers involved in a workers' compensation case: the employer's workers'
compensation carrier, the employer's general liability carrier, and the sued co-employee's personal
carrier. The typical workers' compensation policy does not cover tort actions and does not cover
direct actions by an injured employee against a co-employee because the employer is the named
insured. The typical employer's general liability policy contains a clause that excludes compensation
to any employees. Finally, the co-employee's general liability policy, most often a homeowner policy, usually contains an exclusion for conduct arising out of business activities. As a result, the coemployee may be left without any insurance coverage and may be faced with trying to satisfy a
common-law judgment with personal assets and savings. See Marks, supra note 61, at 399.401
(discussing various potential problems involving insurance policies). But see R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW § 7.6(a) (1971) (discussing source and nature of insurer's duty to defend and the general
position that the obligation to defend is determined by the nature of the claim irrespective of whether
it is meritorious); Kircher & Quinn, Insurer'sDuty To Defend-An Overview, in INSURER'S DUTY
To DEFEND 7 (D. Hirsch & A. Karpowitz eds. 1978) (discussing when the insurer's duty to defend
may arise, the alternatives possible when the duty is doubtful, and the liability the insurer may face
for a wrongful refusal to defend).
104. Pleasant, 312 N.C. at 717, 325 S.E.2d at 250.
105. No. 439A84 (N.C. Feb. 18, 1986).
106. Id, slip op. at 3. Justice Meyer, who dissented in Pleasant,wrote the majority opinion.
The court, by a vote of four to three, affirmed the trial court's grant of defendant employer's motion
for summary judgment. A strong dissent was filed by Justice Martin, joined by Justices Exum and
Frye.
107. Id at 3-4.
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10 9
the alarms. 10 8 Citing the "virtually unanimous rule throughout the country,"
the court held that even considering the complaint in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, the allegations were insufficient to overcome the exclusiveness of
the workers' compensation remedy.1 1
The Barrino court stated that the rationales for allowing a common-law tort
action against a co-employee did not apply to an employer. First, an employer
actively participates in the defense of any compensation claim and in the satisfaction of any award.111 Therefore, the employer should not be required to defend against the same claim in another forum. 1 12 Second, the rationale in
Pleasant, that co-employee liability reduces the burden on an innocent employer, did not apply because "recovery in the civil action. . . can only result11in3
greater liability even if credit is given for the benefits paid under the Act."
Last, the employer, unlike the co-employee, has paid into the compensation system in exchange for tort immunity.,14

It can be persuasively argued, however, that if a co-employee loses immunity under the Workers' Compensation Act due to willful, wanton, and reckless
conduct, an employer who engages in the same type of conduct' 1 5 should also
lose the Act's immunity. Justice Martin made this argument in his dissenting
opinion:
In the present case, company officials systematically flaunted basic
safety regulations and knowingly subjected every employee at the...
plant to death or serious injury. . . . If the defendant's conduct in
Pleasant constitutes willful, wanton and reckless negligence, then
108. Id. at 4-5.
109. Id. at 10. West Virginia has held an employer liable in tort for willful, wanton, and reckless
misconduct. In Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., 246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978), the West Virginia
Supreme Court noted that the purpose of the workers' compensation system is to remove negligently
caused injuries from the common-law tort system. Id. at 911. When an act involves willfulness and
awareness of danger, it ceases to be negligent and becomes deliberate misconduct. Therefore, "when

death or injury results from wilful, wanton or reckless misconduct such death or injury is no longer
accidental in any meaningful sense of the word, and must be taken as having been inflicted with
deliberate intention for the purposes of the workmen's compensation act." Id. at 914.
110. See Barrino,slip op. at 10-13 (discussion of cases requiring deliberate intent to commit the
specific injury as opposed to intentionally permitting dangerous working conditions to exist); see also
2A A. LARsON, supra note 23, § 69.20, at 13-111 (discussing the high level of intent required to
remove an employer from workers' compensation immunity).
111. Barrino, slip op. at 17.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 88-91.
113. Barrino,slip op. at 17. See supra text accompanying notes 92-95. The third reason given by
the Barrinocourt, that plaintiff had made a binding election of remedies upon receiving the workers'
compensation benefits, is discussed supra note 102.
114. See supra note 41.
115. It is clearly the law in North Carolina that an employer loses the Act's immunity for intentional injuries. "We have recognized that, in cases involving intentional injury by the employer, the
employee cannot be relegated to the limited recovery afforded by the Act, but may bring a commonlaw action against the employer." Pleasant, 312 N.C. at 713, 325 S.E.2d at 247; see Warner, 234
N.C. at 733, 69 S.E.2d at 10 (holding that an action against an employer was not maintainable
because "it was admitted in the trial below that the defendant did not intentionally injure the plaintiff"), overruled in part, Pleasant,312 N.C. 710, 325 S.E.2d 244 (1985); Essick v. City of Lexington,
232 N.C. 200, 210, 60 S.E.2d 106, 114 (1950) (quoting S. HOROVrrz, supra note 23, at 336: "It
would be against sound reason to allow the employer deliberately to batter his helper, and then
compel the worker to accept moderate workmen's compensation benefits .... ").

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

clearly the conduct of the defendant-employer in this case embodies a
degree of culpability beyond negligence and as such the exclusivity
provision of the Workers' Compensation Act should not serve to shield
16
the employer from liability for his tortious conduct."
In fact, there may be more compelling reasons to remove the shield of immunity
from an employer who is guilty of such conduct than to remove it from a coemployee because the consequences of employer misconduct can be much
broader and the resulting harm greater. Because the safety of a large group of
workers may be involved, as well as that of the public in general, employers
should be held to a higher standard of care. 117 Further, as the dissent in Barrino
noted, the general assembly's stated desire for workplace safety 1 8 is hindered by
allowing "an employer to assume that no matter how egregious and deliberate
his misconduct, the Workers' Compensation Act will allow him statutory immunity." 119 Allowing an employer to hide behind the protection of the Workers'
Compensation Act violates public policy and inevitably "encourage(s] the employer to weigh the economic costs of compliance with safety regulations against
the costs of workers' compensation and to choose the most cost-effective course
of conduct."' 120 Thus, it is difficult to reconcile the reasoning in Barrino with
Pleasantsimply by showing that in the prior case the defendant was an employer
and in the latter case a co-employee. Not only was the degree of culpability
significantly greater in Barrino, but also the effect and the scope of the employer's behavior greatly exceeded that in Pleasant.
A second issue raised by the Pleasant decision is whether the employer,
under the principles established in Pleasant,may be held vicariously liable under
the doctrine of respondeatsuperior121 for the willful, wanton, and reckless conduct of an employee. In North Carolina, the answer appears to be that the
employer cannot be held liable. When an employee has committed a malicious
or intentional tort, the employer cannot be held liable unless it is shown that the
116. Barrino, slip op. at 7-8 (Martin, J., dissenting).
117. See id. at 4 (Martin, J., dissenting) ("While this Court should be concerned with deterring
negligent and injurious horseplay on the part of a co-employee, we should be more concerned with
deterring intentional employer conduct which is likely to endanger the lives and safety of thousands
of workers."); see also Barrino v. Radiator Specialty Co., 69 N.C. App. 501, 317 S.E.2d 51 (1984),

aff'd, No. 439A84 (N.C. Feb. 18, 1986). Judge Phillips, dissenting from the opinion of the court of
appeals in Barrino, argued:

[When] it is alleged that defendant's plant handles, stores and utilizes liquifled petroleum
gases; and the death of plaintiff's decedent was caused by an explosion and fire that resulted from various deliberate acts of defendant. . . the welfare of all workers, their families, and the public at large requires. . . that defendant not be deemed immune from suit
because of the Workers' Compensation Act.
Id at 504-05, 317 S.E.2d at 53 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
118. "The General Assembly of North Carolina declares it to be its purpose and policy through
the exercise of its powers to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the State of
North Carolina safe and healthful working conditions .... " N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-126(b)(2)
(1985).
119. Barrino, slip op. at 4 (Martin, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 5 (Martin, J., dissenting).
121. In North Carolina an employer is liable under respondeatsuperiorif: (1) the employee was
negligent, (2) such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury, and (3) an employer-employee
relationship existed at the time of the injury and in respect to the act causing the injury. See Graham
v. North Carolina Butane Gas Co., 231 N.C. 680, 58 S.E.2d 757 (1950).
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tort was committed within the scope of the employee's employment and in furtherance of work the employee was hired to do.1 22 In the case of an assault, it
must be shown that the employer expressly authorized the action. 1 23 Otherwise,
the injury is "just one more industrial mishap in the factory, of the sort [the
employer] has a right to consider exclusively covered by the compensation system.' -124 Because the Pleasantcourt has equated intentional torts and willful,
wanton, and reckless conduct, presumably an employer cannot be held liable
under the theory of respondeatsuperior unless the employer expressly authorizes
the action.
A final issue raised by the Pleasantdecision concerns the difficulty in distinguishing between a willful, wanton, and reckless act and an act that merely results from a "residuum of vivacity and good nature which frequently manifests
itself in joking and harmless pranks."' 25 The North Carolina Supreme Court
has recognized that:
It is a self-evident fact that men required to work in daily and intimate
contact with other men are subjected to certain hazards by reason of
the very contact itself because all men are not alike. Some are playful
and full of fun; others are serious and diffident. Some are careless and
reckless; others are painstaking and cautious. The assembling of such
various types of mind and skill into one place must of necessity create
and produce126certain risks and hazards by virtue of the very employment itself.
This recognition is at the heart of the dissent in Pleasant.'27 To Justice Meyer,
the facts showed only "playful, although admittedly dangerous, horseplay-an
attempt to scare Pleasant by driving close to him and scaring him by blowing the
8
horn."12
Two North Carolina cases have addressed the issue whether an injured employee can recover under workers' compensation for injuries suffered while engaged in horseplay. 129 In Chambers v. Union Oil Co. 130 plaintiff was filling a
fuel tank while taunting a co-employee about a pistol the co-employee was carrying. The co-employee tossed the gun into the truck and it accidentally dis122. Robinson v. McAlhaney, 214 N.C. 180, 182, 198 S.E. 647, 649 (1938). See generally 8
N.C. INDEX 3D Master and Servant § 34.2, at 535 (1977) (discussing an employer's liability for an

employee's intentional, reckless, or malicious acts).
123. Daniels, 55 N.C. App. at 560, 286 S.E.2d at 585.
124. Id. (quoting 2A A. LARSON, supra note 23, § 68.21, at 13-32).
125. Chambers v. Union Oil Co., 199 N.C. 28, 31, 153 S.E. 594, 596 (1930) (injury to employee
caused by accidental discharge of fellow worker's pistol when fellow worker threw pistol into a
truck).
126. Id. at 31, 153 S.E. at 595 (emphasis added). In Bare v. Wayne Poultry Co., 70 N.C. App.
88, 94, 318 S.E.2d 534, 539 (1984), disc. rev. denied, 312 N.C. 796, 325 S.E.2d 484 (1985), the North
Carolina Court of Appeals cited Chambers v. Union Oil Co., 199 N.C. 28, 153 S.E. 594 (1930), for
"its proper and insightful recognition that the workers' compensation system is based upon the
realities of human conduct, and that [workers'] occasionally relieving the tedium of their labors by
sportive and foolish acts is a routine and accepted incident of employing them."
127. See Pleasant, 312 N.C. at 718, 325 S.E.2d at 250 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
128. Id.
129. The horseplay doctrine holds that if an employee is injured while engaged in play, he or she

is barred from recovery regardless of whether he or she participated in the particular prank. Chambers v. Union Oil Co., 199 N.C. 28, 32, 153 S.E. 594, 596 (1930); see also IA A. LARSON, supra note
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charged, injuring plaintiff in the foot. The court held that plaintiff could recover
under the Workers' Compensation Act irrespective of whether the activity could
131
Plaintiff in Bare v. Wayne Poultry Co.132
have been regarded as horseplay.
was cut by a chicken deboning knife. Plaintiff had playfully cut a co-employee's
apron string and the co-employee was trying to retaliate. He missed and cut
plaintiff's thigh. The court held that the horseplay did not put plaintiff beyond
the protection of the Workers' Compensation Act.133
Pleasantcan be distinguished from these cases on several grounds. Unlike
the plaintiffs in Chambers and Bare, the plaintiff in Pleasantwas attempting to
obtain compensation in addition to that already received under the Workers'
Compensation Act. Further, the negligence at issue in the horseplay cases was
that of the injured employee. In Pleasantthe negligence of the co-employee was
at issue. Perhaps the courts in Chambers and Bare viewed the acts involved
more leniently in order to find the conduct of an injured employee within the
scope of employment so that the employee could recover under workers' compensation. There is no reason, however, to adopt such a lenient approach when
the acts of an employee tortfeasor are involved.
Justice Meyer's dissent was highly critical of the majority's reasoning in
Pleasant. He rejected the idea that reckless or wanton conduct is the equivalent
of intentional conduct: "Where the employee. . . intends only to do the act and
23, § 23.10, at 5-161 (uniform denial of compensation in older cases based upon the theory that all
sportive assaults were foreign to the peculiar risks of the employment).
In North Carolina the rule has been severely criticized as "inconsistent with the underlying
philosophy of compensation acts," Bare v. Wayne Poultry Co., 70 N.C. App. 88, 94, 318 S.E.2d 534,
539 (1984), disc rev, denied, 312 N.C. 796, 325 S.E.2d 484 (1985), and nothing more than "the old
'fellow-servant' doctrine. . . appearing in a brand-new suit of legal clothes and parading through
the law under the brand-new name of 'horseplay.'" Chambers, 199 N.C. at 32, 153 S.E. at 596.
Because of similar criticisms, the majority of jurisdictions allow for recovery when the injured employee took no part in the horseplay and was going about his or her duties. See, e.g., Gates Rubber
Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 112 Colo.480, 150 P.2d 301 (1944) (employee entitled to recover under
Workers' Compensation Act when he was playfully pushed off a roller on which he was sitting and
injured himself); Ivy H. Smith Co. v. Kates, 395 So. 2d 263 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (compensation awarded to employee when co-employee threw a vine at him and yelled "snake" causing him to
jump up and down in fright and run until he suffered a heart attack); Johnson v. Zurich Gen.
Accident & Liab. Ins. Co., 161 So. 667 (La. App. 1935) (watchman's widow allowed to receive
workers' compensation benefits when husband died as a result of a heart attack when kidnapped by
his co-employees as ajoke); Carvalho v. Decorative Fabrics Co., 117 R.I. 231, 366 A.2d 157 (1976)
(employee injured when co-employee removing lint from his clothing with an air hose stuck the hose
up the employee's rectum as a joke); Sizemore v. State Workmens' Compensation Comm'n, 160 W.
Va. 407, 235 S.E.2d 473 (1977) (employee injured by a fellow worker hitting him on his hardhat with
the handle from a hammer). For additional cases and a discussion of the general rule that nonparticipating victims of horseplay may recover under their state's Workers' Compensation Act, see IA A.
LARSON, supra note 23, § 23.10.
Whether the doctrine of horseplay is a viable defense against employer liability in North Carolina remains undecided. See Bare v. Wayne Poultry Co., 70 N.C. App. 88, 93, 318 S.E.2d 534, 538
(1984) (discussing the opinion in Chambers and noting that although some discussion of the defense
was made, "that question was not before the Court"), disc. rev. denied, 312 N.C. 796, 325 S.E.2d 484
(1985). But see Pleasant,312 N.C. at 721, 325 S.E.2d at 251 (Meyer, J.,
dissenting) ("As this plaintiff neither initiated nor participated in the horseplay resulting in his injury his claim is covered by
our Act.").
130. 199 N.C. 28, 153 S.E. 594 (1930).
131. Id. at 33, 153 S.E. at 596.
132. 70 N.C. App. 88, 318 S.E.2d 534 (1984).'
133. Id. at 91-92, 318 S.E.2d at 537-38.
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clearly does not intend to do the injury, negligence is not eliminated. '[T]he idea
of negligence is eliminated only when the injury or damage is intentional.' "134
In a workers' compensation context, therefore, Justice Meyer would require

an intent to injure, as opposed to an intent merely to do the act, for common-law

liability to be imposed. 135 This requirement is consistent with the basic policies

underlying workers' compensation. Unlike actions involving punitive damages
or second degree homicide, in workers' compensation cases there is an interest
that mitigates against imposing liability on the individual. The entire system of
13 6
Under
workers' compensation is based upon the enterprise liability theory.
this theory there is a strong preference for holding the employer liable because
137
That is, the
"the cost of the product should bear the blood of the workman."'
burden of the injury should be passed on to the consumers of the product instead
of being shouldered by the employee. 13 8 The majority's holding in Pleasant
frustrates this basic policy.

The holding in Pleasant may also be criticized for another reason. By allowing an injured employee a tort recovery, the Pleasant court unnecessarily

eroded the immunity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. There was
no need for the court to enter the "twilight zone" of willful, wanton, and reck-

less conduct in reaching its conclusion that defendant should be held liable for
the injury he caused plaintiff. 139 The court should have held that defendant lost

his immunity under the Act because he committed a battery-an intentional
tort.
The evidence at trial conclusively established that defendant intended 14to°
scare plaintiff by driving as close to him as possible and blowing the horn.
14 1
The
According to North Carolina law, such an act constitutes an assault.
contact of defendant's van with plaintiff was therefore a battery. The essential
134. Pleasant,312 N.C. at 724, 325 S.E.2d at 253 (quoting Foster v. Hyman, 197 N.C. 189, 191,
148 S.E. 36, 38 (1929)).
135. Id. In support of his position, Justice Meyer cited Wesley v. Lea, 252 N.C. 540, 114 S.E.2d
350 (1960), overruled in part, Pleasant, 312 N.C. 710, 325 S.E.2d 244 (1985), wherein the court
stated: "There is no evidence of any intention on the part of defendant to injure plaintiff." Id. at
545, 114 S.E.2d at 354 (emphasis added by Justice Meyer). Justice Meyer apparently believed the
emphasized language highlighted the distinction between intent to do the act and intent to injure.
Pleasant, 312 N.C. at 724, 325 S.E.2d at 253.
136. See I A. LARSON, supra note 23, § 2.20.
137. PROSSER & KIETON, supra note 3, § 80, at 573 (quoting A. Bohlen, A Problem in the
Drafting of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 25 HARv. L. REv. 328, 401, 517 (1912)).
138. As one commentator noted:
The ultimate social philosophy behind compensation liability is belief in the wisdom of
providing, in the most efficient, most dignified, and most certain form, financial and medical benefits for the victims of work-connected injuries which an enlightened community
would feel obliged to provide in any case in some less satisfactory form, and of allocating
the burden of these payments to the most appropriate source of payment, the consumer of
the product.
1 A. LARSON, supra note 23, § 2.20, at 5.
139. See supra text accompanying note 1.
140. The plaintiff saw the van approaching while it was 20 to 30 feet away. The plaintiff was
unable to get out of the way and was therefore hit by the van. See supra note 15 and text accompanying notes 12-15; see also Pleasant,312 N.C. at 718-21, 325 S.E.2d at 250-51 (Meyer, J., dissenting)
(reproduction of the testimony of the defendant at trial).
141. The North Carolina Supreme Court has defined assault as the intent to create an immediate
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elements of a battery are: (1) the intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact
or the intent to create an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and (2) the
actual occurrence of such a contact. 142 Defendant intended to create the imminent apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact and such a contact actually
occurred. The court, therefore, could have found defendant liable by simply
recognizing that the evidence established an intentional
tort and that plaintiff
143
was entitled to recover under the rule of Andrews.
In Pleasantthe court undertook to provide a remedy to an innocently injured employee and in the process expanded workers' liability under the workers' compensation system in a way that frustrates the very purposes for which
the Workers' Compensation Act was created. The holding removed the burden
of the injury from the consumer and placed it upon the employee. This result
effectively disadvantages thousands of North Carolina employees by increasing
the number of cases in which employees can be stripped of their immunity from
liability in tort.
DAVID M. LEDBETrER

apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact with such an apprehension resulting. Dickens v.
Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 444-45, 276 S.E.2d 325, 331 (1981).
142. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, § 9, at 39; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
18 (1965).

§§

13,

The doctrine of transferred intent does not apply in this case. Transferred intent would apply if
defendant had driven a van towards plaintiff with the intent to scare him (assault) but had unintentionally scared or hit a third person. See Prosser, TransferredIntent, 45 TEX. L. REV. 650 (1967)
(discussing the history of the doctrine and the limits of its application).
143. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. This suggestion was rejected by the court of
appeals in Pleasant,supra note 20, but the supreme court never addressed the issue.

